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Abstract—Users receive a multitude of digital- and physical-
security advice every day. Indeed, if we implemented all the
security advice we received, we would never leave our houses or
use the Internet. Instead, users selectively choose some advice to
accept and some (most) to reject; however, it is unclear whether
they are effectively prioritizing what is most important or most
useful. If we can understand from where users take security
advice and how they subsequently develop security behaviors,
we can develop more effective security interventions.
As a first step, we conducted 25 semi-structured interviews of
security-sensitive (those users who deal with sensitive data or hold
security clearances) and general users. These interviews resulted
in several key findings: (1) users’ main sources of digital-security
advice include IT professionals, workplaces, and negative events,
whether experienced personally or retold through TV; (2) users
determine whether to accept digital-security advice based on the
trustworthiness of the advice-source, as they feel inadequately
able to evaluate the advice content; (3) users reject advice for
many reasons, from believing that someone else is responsible
for their security to finding that the advice contains too much
marketing material or threatens their privacy; and (4) security-
sensitive users differ from general users in a number of ways,
including feeling that digital-security advice is more useful in
their day-to-day lives and relying heavily on their workplace as
a source of security information. These and our other findings
inform a set of design recommendations for enhancing the efficacy
of digital-security advice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT) list of advice for home computer users there are
61 topics, with at least three paragraphs and approximately
500 words of advice per topic. This single US-CERT page
contains more than 30,000 words of digital-security advice.
If users listened to all of the security advice that must be
contained in all of the digital- and physical-security advice
sources available today, they would never leave their houses
or use the Internet again. Since users are still leaving their
houses, and most certainly still using the Internet, how are
they determining which security advice to implement and
which to discard? It is important to understand how users
learn security behaviors in order to ensure that the best or
most important security tactics can break through the noise
and attract adoption from users.
Previous research related to users’ security behaviors has
primarily focused on identifying those behaviors and experi-
menting with how to change them [1], [2]. Other work has
shown the important influence of social factors on security
behavior [3], [4]. Additional work has proposed that users
choose which behaviors to practice based on an analysis of
the costs and benefits [5], [6]. Yet other work has examined
which pieces of digital-security advice are most important [7].
Despite this past work, there has been no comprehensive
analysis of why users choose to accept and reject digital
security advice and from what sources they take this advice.
Therefore, as a first step toward establishing best practices
for designing and disseminating security advice, we sought to
answer the following research questions:
Q1) Where do users learn digital and physical security be-
haviors?
Q2) Why do users accept or reject different advice?
Q3) How do users’ advice sources, reasons for accepting or
rejecting advice, and valuation of advice differ for digital
and physical security?
Q4) Do users from different demographic groups consult
different advice sources or have different reasons for
accepting or rejecting advice?
Q5) Do different advice sources lead to more secure users?
To address these questions, we conducted a semi-structured
interview study with 25 participants of varied demographics.
During a 60-minute interview, we asked questions designed
to help participants articulate their digital-security habits, as
well as where they learned these strategies and why they chose
to implement them. We also addressed where they learned
and why they reject security strategies that they have heard
about but choose not employ. We explicitly compared this
information to the ways that participants learn and process
physical-security advice, to see whether mechanisms that
inform physical-security advice-taking can be imported to
the digital domain. Further, we recruited participants in two
groups: security-sensitive users who handle data governed by
a security clearance or by HIPAA or FERPA regulations,
and general users who do not. This allowed us to consider
the effect that regular exposure to a data-security mindset
has on the ways that users process security advice in their
personal (non-work) lives. Finally, we explored as a case study
participants’ reactions to two-factor authentication, which has
been identified as a highly effective but underutilized security
tool [7].
We rigorously analyzed this interview data using an itera-
tive open-coding process. We identified several key findings,
including:
• Participants evaluate digital-security advice based pri-
marily on the trustworthiness of the advice source. This
contrasts sharply with physical security, where the trust-
worthiness of the source is less important because users
feel comfortable evaluating the content of the advice
themselves and determining its value. Security-sensitive
participants are even more likely than other participants
to rely on the trustworthiness of the source of digital-
security advice.
• Participants have many more reasons for rejecting both
digital- and physical-security advice than for accepting
it. For digital security in particular, these reasons include
not just the obvious—that advice is too complicated or
that the participant is oversaturated—but also more subtle
rationales, such as the presence of too much marketing,
concerns about privacy, and the expectation that someone
or something else (often a digital service provider) is
responsible for keeping them safe.
• Prior work has identified negative personal experience
as a learning tool [2]; we extend this by finding that
TV shows and movies that present negative security
events with clearly defined causes can be equally strong
motivators for adopting new security behaviors.
• Security-sensitive participants are more likely than other
participants to believe that digital-security advice is more
useful in their day-to-day lives than is physical-security
advice; they are also more likely to cite their workplace
as a source of digital-security advice they adopt. This
suggests that exposure to a data-security mindset does
affect the way users process security information, even
in a non-work context.
Based on these and other trends extracted from our in-
terviews, we distill recommendations for designing and dis-
seminating more effective security advice. We believe these
guidelines can help security experts to magnify the impact of
truly important security advice.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss prior research in three related
areas: examining the factors that influence users’ security
behaviors, determining which security behaviors or recom-
mendations are valuable, and developing or evaluating security
behavior interventions.
A. Factors Influencing Security Behaviors
Several researchers have examined how specific factors
influence security behaviors. Das et al. demonstrated the
importance of social influence; for example, showing users
information about their Facebook friends’ security behaviors
made them more likely to adopt the same behaviors [1], [8].
Relatedly, Rader et al. found that security stories from non-
expert peers affect how users think about computer security
and how they make security decisions like whether to click on
a link [2]. Wash identified “folk models” of security, such as
viewing hackers like digital graffiti artists, that influence users’
perceptions of what is and is not dangerous [9]. Our work
broadens these findings by explicitly considering a variety of
ways, social and otherwise, in which users may learn about
different security behaviors.
Security decisions are often framed as economic tradeoffs,
in which users ignore security best practices due to rational
cost-benefit optimization. Herley, for example, suggests that if
users were to spend one minute of each day checking URLs
to avoid phishing, the time cost would be much larger than
the cost of the phishing itself [5]. To investigate whether
users are in fact making rational cost-benefit calculations, we
examine users’ reported thought processes when accepting and
rejecting security advice. Further, researchers have considered
a compliance budget: the limited time and resources users
can spend on security behavior [6], [10]. This highlights the
importance of understanding how users decide which advice
they spend their compliance budget on, so that the most
valuable advice can be designed to rise to the top. Although
this prior work also focuses on why users implement or reject
security behaviors, our work differs in a few key ways: our
study is about home security behaviors, whereas Beautement
et al. addressed only the organizational environment; relatedly,
our study draws from a larger and more diverse participant
pool; finally, we investigate not only why users reject security
behaviors but also why they accept or reject advice and from
what sources, including but not limited to their workplace,
they get this advice.
Other researchers have considered how demographics affect
security and privacy decision-making. Howe et al. note that
socioeconomic status, and the corresponding belief that one’s
information may not be “important enough to hack,” can affect
security behaviors [4]. The paper also notes large differences in
advice sources between undergraduate and adult populations.
Wash and Rader investigated security beliefs and behaviors
among a large, representative U.S. sample and found that
more educated users tended to have more sophisticated beliefs
but take fewer precautions [11]. Others have investigated how
demographic and personality factors influence susceptibility to
phishing [12], [13]. Rainie et al. found that younger people,
social media users, and those who had a prior bad experience
were more likely to try to hide their online behavior. Based
on this prior work, we recruited specifically for diversity of
age, income, education, and race. Further, we recruited for
and analyzed the impact of an additional type of diversity:
security sensitivity, meaning professional training to handle
confidential or sensitive data. In addition, during our data
analysis, we coded for participants who discussed whether
their information was important to protect and whether they
had prior negative experiences.
Although prior work touches on similar themes, to our
knowledge we are the first to comprehensively examine users’
primary sources of digital security advice in general and why
they choose to accept or reject it. Further, our work directly
compares digital security to physical security, which has a
much longer history of providing and adopting behavioral
advice. By drawing lessons from each domain, we develop
design guidelines for effectively transmitting security infor-
mation.
Assessing Security Behaviors. In order to assess the factors
that influence participants’ security behaviors, it is important to
know what behaviors participants are using. One tool to assess
participant behaviors is SEBIS, a 16-item measure of self-
reported security behaviors [14]. In this paper, we apply SEBIS
as an objective measure of participants’ relative security levels.
B. Expert Advice and Best Practices
Any attempt to improve the dissemination and adoption
of security advice will of course require decisions about
which advice is relevant and important. In recent work, Ion
et al. surveyed more than 200 security experts to determine
what behaviors they most often practice and/or strongly rec-
ommend [7]. Top suggestions included installing software
updates, using two-factor authentication, and using a pass-
word manager. Corporate and government help pages from
organizations such as Microsoft, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team, and McAfee also provide users
with pieces of top advice, including tips for improving the
strength of passwords and encouragement to update software
regularly [15]–[17]. These best practices provide insight into
what advice is most valuable to give users; in this paper,
we address the related but orthogonal problem of how users
receive and respond to advice, and therefore how important
advice can be disseminated when it is identified.
C. User Education and Security Interventions
There is a large body of work devoted to analyzing and
improving delivery of security information to users, particu-
larly in the context of user education and designing security
warnings. For example, significant research has examined how
to educate users about phishing prevention [18]–[20]. There
has also been considerable work addressing the effectiveness
of phishing and SSL warnings for browsers [21]–[24], bank-
ing security warnings [25], and security-warning habituation
generally [26]. Other researchers have considered how best
to nudge users to create stronger passwords [27], [28] and
how to inform them about potentially invasive mobile app
permissions [29], [30]. Our work takes an alternate view:
rather than focus on how to promote adoption of one specific
security behavior, we consider why users make the security
decisions they do, where they get their educational materials,
and how they evaluate credibility.
III. METHODOLOGY
To answer our research questions, we conducted semi-
structured interviews in our laboratory between March and
October 2015. To support generalizable and rigorous qual-
itative results, we conducted interviews until new themes
stopped emerging (25 participants) [31]. Our subject pool is
larger than the 12-20 interviews suggested by qualitative best-
practices literature; as such, it can provide a strong basis
for both future quantitative work and generalizable design
recommendations [32].
The study was approved by our institution’s human-subjects
ethics review board. Below, we discuss our recruitment pro-
cess, interview procedure, details of our qualitative analysis,
and limitations of our work.
A. Recruitment
We recruited participants from a large metro area in the U.S.
via Craiglist postings and by sending emails to neighborhood
listservs. We also distributed emails in public- and private-
sector organizations with the help of known contacts in those
organizations. In addition, we posted flyers in university
buildings and emailed university staff members. We collected
demographic information including age, gender, income, job
role, zip code, and education level from respondents in order
to ensure a broad diversity of participants. Participants were
compensated $25 for an approximately one-hour interview
session.
B. Procedure
We asked participants to bring a device they use to connect
to the Internet for personal use with them to their interview.
Two researchers conducted all of the interviews, which took
between 40 and 70 minutes. We used a semi-structured in-
terview protocol, in which the interviewer primarily uses a
standard list of questions but has discretion to ask follow-ups
or skip questions that have already been covered [33]. Semi-
structured interviews allow researchers to gather information
about participants’ practices, habits, and experiences as well
as their opinions and attitudes [33].
During the interview, we asked questions about participants’
digital- and physical-security habits as well as where they
learned those habits (Q1). We also asked participants to “act
out” their use of technology in a series of scenarios. We asked
questions about participants’ behaviors and advice sources for
digital-security topics such as device security, including pass-
word protection and antivirus use; web browsing and emailing,
including two-factor authentication and phishing questions;
and online banking and shopping, including questions about
the participant’s banking login process and payment methods
(Q1, Q3). We asked similar questions regarding physical-
security topics such as dwelling security, including questions
about locking methods and alarm systems; transit (e.g. car
and bike) security, with questions similar to those asked for
dwelling security; and personal safety when walking alone,
including questions about carrying weapons (Q1, Q3). We
validated that our list of digital security topics broadly covered
the same topics as those mentioned as high priority in Ion,
Reeder and Consolvo’s recent paper [7].
On each of these topics, participants were first asked a
general open-ended question regarding their security behav-
iors: for example, “How do you protect your devices?” and
then asked sequentially more specific questions, for example:
“Can you show me how you access the home screen on your
smartphone?”, “Have you always had/not had a password on
your smartphone?”, and “Are there other strategies you use
for protecting your devices which you have not mentioned?”
Participants were subsequently asked a series of follow-up
questions on each topic, such as “Why do you use this
strategy?” (Q2); “Have you ever had a negative experience
with...?” (Q1); and “Where or from whom did you learn
this strategy?” (Q1). In addition to questions regarding spe-
cific security topics, participants were asked more generally
about where, from whom, and why they accepted security
advice, as well as about strategies they had considered but
not adopted (Q2). Participants were also asked to compare
digital- and physical-security advice in terms of usefulness
and trustworthiness (Q3). Finally, participants were asked to
briefly describe their current or most recent job. They were
specifically asked if they handled sensitive data as part of their
job, and if so, what kind (Q3).
To more objectively assess participants’ security behavior,
we also administered the Security Behavior Intentions Scale
(SEBIS) at the end of the interview session (Q5) [14]. The
SEBIS measure was given to 16 of our 25 participants, as
we added it once it became available. Finally, demographic
information was collected during recruitment (Q4).
C. Analysis
The interview data was analyzed using an iterative open-
coding process [34]. Once the two researchers completed
the interviews, they transcribed 17 of the interviews. The
remaining eight interviews were transcribed by an external
transcription service. The researchers then met in person to
develop and iteratively update an initial set of codes for the
data. Subsequently, they independently coded each interview,
incrementally updating the codebook as necessary and re-
coding previously coded interviews. This process was repeated
until all interviews were coded. We then compared the codes
of the two interviewers by computing the inter-coder percent
agreement using the ReCal2 software package [35]. The inter-
coder percent agreement for this study is 75%. This is a
reasonable score for an exploratory semi-structured study, with
a large number of codes, such as ours [36]. Further, after
calculating this percent agreement score, the interviewers met
to iterate on the codes until they reached 100% agreement on
the final codes for each interview.
D. Signifying Prevalence
For each finding, we state the number of participants
who expressed this sentiment, as an indication of prevalence.
However, our results are not quantitative, and a participant
failing to mention a particular item for which we coded does
not imply they disagree with that code; rather the participant
may have simply failed to mention it. We plan to conduct a
follow-up quantitative analysis to investigate the prevalence of
our findings on a statistically representative sample.
E. Limitations
Our study has several limitations common to qualitative
research. While we asked participants to search their memory
for answers to our questions, they may not have fully done
so, or they may have forgotten some information. To mitigate
satisficing [37], interviewers repeatedly prompted participants
to give full answers to all questions. Participants may also
have tired and provided less thorough answers toward the end
of the interview, and those who were particularly concerned
about the interviewer’s perception of them may have altered
their answers in order to not portray themselves as overly
secure or insecure [37], [38]. Additionally, the age, gender
and race of the interviewers may have introduced some bias
into participants’ responses. We recruited a diverse pool of
participants to increase the odds that relevant ideas would be
mentioned by at least one participant, despite these limitations.
IV. RESULTS
In this section we detail the results of our study. First,
we will discuss our participants’ demographics and security-
sensitivity. An overview of these demographics is shown in
Table I. Second, we will address the sources from which
participants accept security advice and how these sources
differ across genders and for physical and digital security. A
summary of these sources is shown in Figure 1. Third, we will
address the different reasons our participants gave for accept-
ing and rejecting digital- and physical-security advice; some
of the differences in these reasons were unanticipated. Fourth,
we address differences between security-sensitive and general
users, which imply that security-sensitive users’ advice taking
behavior differs based on the digital-security information they
are exposed to in their workplaces. Finally, we present a case
study on two-factor authentication, a behavior found by Ion et
al. to have high security importance, but low adoption [7].
A. Participants
We recruited 158 potential participants and selected 47 to
interview. We selected a balance of men and women, as well
as a diversity of age, ethnicity and education. Of the 47
participants selected for interviews, 25 attended their interview
appointments.
Demographics for our 25 participants are shown in Table I.
Fifty-six percent of our participants are female, slightly more
female than the general U.S. population in 2014 (51%) [39].
Our sample is somewhat less Hispanic (8% vs. 17%) and
less White (40% vs. 62%), but more Black (44% vs. 13%)
than the U.S. population [39]. We had a proportional number
of Asian participants (8%). However, the racial makeup of
our sample more closely matched the racial proportions of
our metro area. Our metro area is 43% White (our sample:
40% White), 46% Black (our sample: 44%), 10% Hispanic
(our sample: 8%) and 4% Asian (our sample: 8%) [40]. Our
participant sample is wealthier than the US population and
our demographic area: 28% of our participants earn less than
$50,000, whereas 47% of the general US population earns
less than $50,000 per year [41]; and 40.1% of people in
Sec.
ID Gender Age Race Educ. Income Type
P1 M 31-40 W M.S. $90-$125k F
P2 F 22-30 A B.S. $50-$70k –
P3 M 18-22 W SC $90-$125k F
P4 F 51-60 W PhD $150k+ S
P5 F 22-30 B M.S. $90-$125k F
P6 F 41-50 W M.S. $30-$50k –
P7 F 31-40 H M.S $70-$90k F
P8 F 31-40 B M.S. $90-$125k –
P9 M 22-30 W B.S. $50-$70k S
P10 M 22-30 B B.S. $50-$70k S
P11 M 60+ W P $90-$125k C
P12 M 41-50 B SC $0-$30k S
P13 F 31-40 A M.S. $0-$30k –
P14 F 31-40 B SC $90-$125k –
P15 F 41-50 B Assoc. $50-$70k C
P16 F 31-40 H H.S. $0-$30k –
P17 F 18-22 B H.S. $0-$30k –
P18 M 18-22 B H.S. $0-$30k –
P19 F 22-30 B M.S. $50-$70k F
P20 F 60+ W PhD $150k+ –
P21 M 41-50 W PhD $150k+ C
P22 M 60+ W SC $90-$125k –
P23 F 22-30 B Assoc. $70-$90k H
P24 M 41-50 W B.S. $30-$50k S
P25 M 18-22 B Assoc. $70-$90k H
TABLE I
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS. THE COLUMNS SHOW: PARTICIPANT
IDENTIFIERS (CODED BY INTERVIEW DATE ORDER), GENDER, AGE, RACE,
EDUCATION, INCOME, TYPE OF WORK SECURITY, AND SECURITY
SENSITIVITY. THE ABBREVIATIONS W/B/A/H IN THE RACE COLUMN
STAND FOR WHITE, BLACK, ASIAN, AND HISPANIC, RESPECTIVELY. THE
ABBREVIATIONS NO H.S./H.S./SC/B.S./ASSOC./M.S./PH.D./P IN THE
EDUCATION COLUMN STAND FOR NO HIGH SCHOOL, HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATE, SOME COLLEGE, BACHELORS DEGREE, ASSOCIATES DEGREE,
MASTERS DEGREE, DOCTORAL DEGREE, AND PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
(E.G. MBA, J.D.), RESPECTIVELY. THE SECURITY TYPE DATA COLUMN
INDICATES WHICH TYPES OF SENSITIVE DATA THE PARTICIPANTS
HANDLE, IF ANY. THE ABBREVIATIONS F/H/S/C/– IN THE SECURITY TYPE
COLUMN STAND FOR FERPA, HIPPA, AND SSN DATA HANDLING, THE
HOLDING OF A SECURITY CLEARANCE, AND NO WORK WITH SENSITIVE
DATA, RESPECTIVELY.
our metro area earn less than $50,000 [40]. Our sample is,
however, representative of the educational attainment in our
demographic area: 88% of our participants hold a high school
degree or higher, compared with 90.1% per our metro area
census; and 60% of our participants hold a Bachelor’s degree
or higher, compared to 55% in our metro area [40].
B. How Security Behaviors Are Learned
Participants reported implementing digital- and physical-
security advice from a number of sources. In this section,
we address our findings on users’ most common sources for
both digital and physical security: media, family members,
and peers. Additionally, we discuss negative experiences as a
security behavior learning tool; our findings emphasize and
expand prior findings on the importance of security stories for
teaching digital security behaviors [2]. Next, we address advice
sources unique to digital security, including IT professionals,




























Fig. 1. Prevalence of advice sources for digital and physical security.
the workplace, and providers of participants’ digital services
(e.g. Comcast). Finally, we include two interpretive sections
discussing differences in advice sources between men and
women, as well as whether different advice sources have an
impact on users’ security behaviors, as measured with the
SEBIS scale [14].
Common Source: Media. Almost all participants (N=24)
reported receiving both digital- and physical-security infor-
mation from media. Media included online articles, forums,
television shows, news shows, the radio, magazines, and
advertisements. Five participants reported using media as an
information source only for digital security, three reported
using media only for physical security, and the remaining
16 participants used media for both digital- and physical-
security information. Of those who cited media as an advice
source for digital security, six participants cited a specific
technology-oriented resource: “Some of the blog[s] I read [are]
by computer people. For example, I read Wired,” says P20.
In general, the technical sources cited by these participants
were: CNet, Wired, Bruce Schneier’s blog, Mashable, and
an interview on the topic of Snowden conducted by John
Oliver [42]–[46].
Common Source: Peers. Fifteen participants cited their
peers as a source of digital- or physical-security advice. Peers
included friends and colleagues who were not family members.
Interestingly, only two participants cited peers as a source of
advice for both digital and physical security. The remaining
participants only cited peers as a source for digital (N=6) or
physical security (N=7). It seems that if participants trust their
friends on the topic of physical security, they do not consider
them authoritative on digital security, and vice versa. Further,
while a few participants consider some of these peers to be
experts (N=5), expert status in all cases was determined not by
education or job role (e.g. IT professional, alarm technician)
but rather by participant’s perceptions of the “tech-savviness”
or physical-security expertise of their peer.
Common Source: Family. Family members are another
frequent source of physical and digital-security advice (N=21).
Unlike their use of peers for only digital- or physical-security
advice but not both, eight participants took advice from a fam-
Digital
Physical
Types of Negative Experiences and Security Stories














self friends/family TVS lf Pe rs/Family
13 7 1
10 5 3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
trust
useful
cyber more physical mor equal
Fig. 2. Distribution of types of negative experiences from which participants
learned new security behaviors: personal events, stories told by peers, and
stories in TV shows or movies.
ily member for both physical and digital security. That said,
10 participants consulted family members only for physical-
security advice while three consulted family strictly for digital-
security advice. This may be because the family members most
often consulted were parents, and younger participants whose
parents are still living may not consult their older, and perhaps
less tech-experienced, parents for digital security advice.
Common Source: Negative Experiences. As reported in
Rader and Wash’s work on security stories, negative events
described by peers or directly experienced by participants can
be strong learning tools [2]. In our study, we found that 24 par-
ticipants either had negative experiences themselves or knew
peers who described negative events, which led to behavior
changes. Our participant sample was smaller, yet broader,
than that used in Rader and Wash’s work, and our results
thus confirm the generalizability of their findings beyond the
college student population [2]. Even more interestingly, we
found that vignettes from TV shows may be equally salient as
stories told by a friend or negative events experienced in real
life.
Although only four participants cited TV shows specifically,
each strongly recalled stories of negative physical or digital
security-related events happening to characters in those shows.
They directly credited these shows with leading to a specific
change in their behavior. For example, P12 put a password
on his WiFi network after watching a tech show that showed
“people going by houses and WiFi snooping and knocking
on people’s doors saying, ‘Oh your WiFi is open, you need
to protect it’ . . . shows like that, [they] make you think.”
P14 had a similar experience: Watching a movie motivated
her to always check the back seats in her car for a lurking
person before getting into the car. “People had mentioned that
you should check your back seats before but I never paid
attention to it until [this] movie,” she says. Thus, it seems
that TV shows or movies may serve as strong proxies for
a negative experience that happens directly to the user or
someone she knows. We hypothesize two reasons for this: (1)
while participants often blamed themselves or their friends for
personality or behavioral flaws that led to security problems,
they were more likely to give relatable fictional characters or
the unknown real victims shown on TV the benefit of the
doubt; and (2) TV shows and movies are typically designed
to be vivid, realistic, and believable, thus making participants
feel that what is happening on the screen could happen to
them, too.
That said, we found that negative experiences that occur
directly to the user were the most prevalent learning tools
(N=13 for digital, N=10 for physical), as compared to security
stories told by others (N=7 for digital, N=5 for physical) or
conveyed via visual media (N=1 for digital, N=3 for physical).
The distribution of the types of security stories on which
participants relied is shown in Figure 2. Additionally, as
might be expected, when participants feel that the person who
experienced the negative event did all they could to prevent
it and there are no additional measures that could be taken,
the story of the negative event does not lead to any behavior
change. For example, P2 had a friend who was robbed, but did
not change her own behavior “because I think she took all the
precautions she reasonably could. She parked in a brightly lit
area and a reasonably safe neighborhood, pretty close to where
she was going to be. I don’t think that there was much [that she
could have done.] She could have had somebody walk with her
maybe, but the guy had a gun, so I don’t think anything would
have changed.” Further, if the participant believes the victim
bears some responsibility for the negative event—for example,
they are “not as tech-savvy” than the participant, or live in a
“less safe area”, the negative event likely will not serve as a
learning tool. P24 and P9 have had friends who got viruses,
but they did not do anything differently afterwards, because
they felt that the friends were victimized due to their lack of
technical expertise. Finally, negative experiences may not be
effective information sources when the user cannot identify
why the negative event happened, or what they could have
done to prevent it. For example P18 comments, “I actually
think recently someone tried to log into my email from China
and Google sent me an email and Google blocked it and said
it looked strange and I said it was very strange,” but he did
not alter his behavior after this incident.
In summary, our participants shared with us a total of 45
negative experiences or stories. As a result of 20 of these
stories the participants’ changed a digital-security behavior.
Additionally, 14 stories and experiences led to a physical
behavior change, and eleven led to no change in behavior.
Digital Only: IT Professionals. IT professionals are an in-
formation source strictly for digital-security methods (N=12).
These professionals can be colleagues in the participant’s
work environment or friends of the participant. As we will
discuss in Section IV-C, a participant’s belief that a digital-
security advice source is trustworthy is a primary factor in
whether participants choose to accept the advice; it seems that
participants view IT professionals as especially trustworthy.
“For personal, I might talk to one of the IT guys about that.
I just talk to . . . the one I’m most friends with, I always
try to get information: what’s the best intervention, what do
you think?” comments P15. Further, participants may use IT
professionals to evaluate the trustworthiness of advice they
have seen elsewhere. For example, P19 says that when she is
looking for new digital-security advice, she will “talk to the
IT guy at my office. I’ve talked to him a couple of times about
my phone and whatever I hear or read.” Although participants
may receive useful advice from colleagues and friends who
are IT professionals, this advice may not be sufficient. For
example, as P13 notes: “My friends who work in IT, they just
tell you to change your password as often as possible.”
Digital Only: Workplace. In addition to information users
solicit from IT professionals, users also receive unsolicited
security advice from their workplaces in the form of newslet-
ters, IT emails, or required trainings. Fourteen participants
cited receiving this type of advice. P4 says, for example, that
she learned from work not to click links in emails that claim
she needs to update her password. “We got an email from IT
telling us that, never will there’ll be an email from them that
would require you to do that.” Similarly, P8 pays attention to
her security trainings at work: “They’ll do yearly IT security
training, which is not even necessarily for work, but just for
life . . . they talk about things like not sending people money
over Facebook . . . they also email out updates when things
change. I do actually pay attention to those emails when they
send them, like about privacy notice updating.” Further, P2
says she “always reads the IT newsletter” put out by her
workplace.
Digital Only: Service Provider. Another source of digital
security information cited by nine participants is the corpora-
tions that provide a service to the participant (e.g. SunTrust
Bank, Apple, Verizon). For example, P23 comments: “I usually
call my carrier (Comcast) and they have security stuff for your
internet and they’ll tell me what I can do.”
Comparison: Gender and Advice. Eighteen participants,
evenly split between men and women, cited a man as a source
of digital-security advice, while only three cited a woman. This
may be because historically men have been overrepresented
in technology and computing fields and thus are considered
to be more authoritative on that topic [47]. Alternatively, the
overabundance of digital-security advice provided by men may
occur because men offer more unsolicited advice in the domain
of digital security, or because women are still underrepresented
in IT and computing fields and thus there are fewer women
who chose to offer digital-security advice [48].
On the other hand, 12 participants cited a woman as a source
of physical-security advice, compared to three participants
who cited men. Eight of these 12 participants were women
themselves. Historically, women have had higher rates of
crime victimization, perceive themselves to be at higher risk
of victimization, and express greater fear of crime than do
men [49]. It is probable that women are aware of this gendered
difference in threat levels and perceptions, and thus find each
other more relatable sources of advice.
The Impact Of Different Advice Sources On Users’ Se-
curity Behaviors. We used the SEBIS scale to measure
participants’ security behavior intentions; the scale results in
a score from 1 to 5 [14]. A score of 5 indicates that the user
intends to behave more securely than a user with a score of
1. The average SEBIS score for participants who used each
of the information sources mentioned above were all between
2.7 and 3.3; therefore, we find no evidence that any particular
advice source impacts behavioral intentions more than another.
C. Why Advice is Accepted
What leads users to accept advice from the sources men-
tioned above? In this section, we discuss participants’ reasons
for accepting digital-security advice: we find the trustworthi-
ness of the advice source is the key metric for the domain
of digital security. This finding may be explained by another
of our findings: participants struggle to assess the plausibility
and value of digital-security advice. In contrast, participants’
relative confidence in their assessment of the plausibility of
and necessity for physical-security advice leads them to cite
their own evaluation of the advice’s content as the primary
assessment metric in the physical domain. We also in this
section compare which advice, physical or digital, participants
feel is more useful and/or more trustworthy.
Digital-Security Advice. Eleven participants used the trust-
worthiness of the advice source to determine whether to take
digital-security advice.
In the case of media advice, participants must determine
whether advice offered by an unknown author is trustworthy.
Participants mentioned five heuristics that they use to measure
the trustworthiness of a media advice source, including: their
knowledge and trust of the advice author, other user’s reviews
of the advice, how widespread the advice was on various
media outlets, whether the content of the advice differed
strongly from their current behavior, and the simplicity of the
advice. All of these heuristics were equally prevalent in our
data.
The first technique mentioned for evaluating media advice
source trustworthiness was to evaluate the author or media
outlet providing the advice: P20 notes that her acceptance of
advice, “depends on the author and how the article is written.”
P22 says he finds advice useful “If I would quote that source to
someone else, like the Washington Post, [or another] reputable
media outlet. If it’s just some Matt Drudge on the Internet
advising about computer security, I would just ignore that more
quickly than I saw it.”
A second evaluation metric was other users’ reviews of the
advice. Two security sensitive users, one who holds a M.S.
in digital security (P24) and another who handled FERPA
data as an HR file clerk (P10), crowd-sourced their advice
and software evaluation. P24 comments, “I evaluate YouTube
howto videos and other advice channels via user comments.”
Similarly, P10 says, “I look at reviews and the software and
the website to decide whether to use the advice or download
[software]. I look at whether it has a good reputation—
whether it is popular with online reviewing.”
A third heuristic for advice evaluation was how widespread
across different media outlets the advice became, with the im-
plicit assumption that distribution outlets who reprinted a given
piece of advice had evaluated the sources and information and
found it to be valid. P25 comments that he trusts “news that’s
backed up by facts and is across multiple channels, because
if it’s not good, multiple places won’t pick it up.”
A fourth metric for evaluating a media advice-source trust-
worthiness was how much the content of the advice differed
from the participant’s current behavior: P5 says she took the
advice because “it was the opposite of what I was doing, so it
automatically made it seem as though it was more credible.”
P2 comments that she took the advice since “it made sense;
I guess if [my password is] a bit longer, it’s harder for [a
malicious] computer to figure it out.”
Finally, a fifth heuristic for media advice-source evaluation
is the simplicity of the advice. P2 adds, “If it’s just tips that
you can implement in your everyday life, then the advice feels
more trustworthy” and P16 wishes that advice “would have a
better setup to say ‘Here, this is what you have to do for step
one, step two, step three.’ . . . like from Google when they’re
saying that you can [add] privacy.”
Participants may rely on the trustworthiness of the advice
source because they are not confident in their own ability to
evaluate the content of the advice. Indeed, P7 says, “physical
security is related more to me and my body . . . it makes sense
to me whereas with computer security, I’m securing myself
from threats that I don’t even know anything about...I know
when somebody walks up with a gun that I should be worried.”
P12 also notes that the tangibility of physical security can
make personal safety strategies more trustworthy and easier to
implement, commenting, “you know, cyber security is great,
but the people who are doing it are so smart that they can put
back doors in it that you don’t even know about, so sometimes,
I don’t even trust the advice...with physical security, I can
touch that, or I know someone that I can relate to.”
That said, participants’ ability to judge the trustworthiness
of the advice source may vary. For example, in the case of
peer advice, users may not be able to accurately judge the
trustworthiness of their peers as an advice source. As an
example of good advice, P9 learned to use incognito browsing
from a friend, “incognito came out in college and a friend
came over and needed to use gmail and just said look at
this and logged himself into gmail and didn’t need to log
me out and it’s useful.” Similarly, P15 learned about security
alarm systems “years ago, from a friend of mine who had a
security alarm business.” However, P17 mentioned being told
less credible information such as the following: “A lot of my
friends don’t have iPhones because, this is the term they use,
iPhones are hot. Like they attract all the attention to your
phone, like anything you’re doing illegal it can get caught on
your phone, ‘cause its like a hot box iPhone. It can be tracked
in any type of way, stuff like that. I didn’t even know that, I
was like whoaaaaa it can be tracked? If I had known that, I
wouldn’t have gotten an iPhone, yeah.”
physical-security advice. Consequently, since participants
are more confident in their ability to evaluate the plausibility of
physical-security advice content, for physical security, the ad-
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Participants’ Opinions of Security Advice
Fig. 3. Participants’ opinions regarding which security advice, digital or
physical, is most useful.
vice source is of lesser importance. Only three participants cite
the trustworthiness of a physical-advice source as an important
metric, and those participants also cited this metric for digital
security. Instead, participants rely on their own assessments
of the plausibility of and necessity for the physical-security
advice to determine whether to implement new physical-
security behaviors (N=7). On the subject of plausibility, P22
says about physical-security advice, “if it doesn’t pass the
smell test, in other words if it just doesn’t seem plausible,
then I dismiss it. If it’s something that I recognize as making
sense,” then he will consider implementing it.
Digital vs. Physical Advice: Usefulness and Trust.
Figure 3 shows participants’ assessments of the trustworthi-
ness and usefulness of digital- and physical-security advice.
Half of our participants (N=13) felt that physical-security
advice was more trustworthy overall than digital-security ad-
vice. Only two participants felt that digital-security advice was
more trustworthy than physical-security advice. The remaining
10 participants felt that digital- and physical-security advice
was equally trustworthy. We suspect that this was largely be-
cause, as mentioned above, participants find physical-security
advice easier to mentally evaluate (N=7). P9 comments that
he would probably trust physical-security advice more than
digital-security advice because: “there are a lot fewer variables.
I trust it more because it’s easier to evaluate if it’s legitimate.”
Similarly, P23 says that she trusts physical-security advice
more because it is “more hands on and visual, it’s in your
face a little bit more.”
Relatedly, five participants trust physical-security advice
more because they feel it is simpler and easier to implement
than digital-security advice. “Physical-security advice is more
trustworthy because it’s more common sense and they don’t
typically require you to download and install something that
would be trouble in itself,” comments P20.
Participants are more split on which advice, digital or phys-
ical, is more useful. Nine participants feel that physical advice
is more useful, primarily for the same reasons they found
physical advice more trustworthy: “I can see the relevance
in the personal security whereas the computer security, again
I am trusting that because I have a little icon on the right that
it is doing its job. Do I know what it it’s doing? No.” says P7.
Similarly, P3 comments that he finds physical-security advice
more useful because: “Again, it’s my understanding. It just
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Fig. 4. Distribution of reasons participants rejected digital- and physical-
security advice.
comes so much more naturally.”
On the other hand, the 10 participants who feel that digital
advice is more useful noted that there are more techniques
available for digital than physical security and that they feel
a higher risk of digital threats. To the first point, P15 says:
“digital-security advice is more useful—because with digital
I can probably do more research, and there’s more to do
there than the physical. Physical you can only do so much,
I don’t care what I have on me, someone can overpower me.”
With regard to feeling that there is more digital than physical
security risk, P11 comments, “[I] find digital security more
useful and more trustworthy because there is so much more
research on it and it’s so much more pervasive.”
D. Why Advice is Rejected
While trustworthiness and plausibility are the two main
reasons users choose to accept advice, there are a multitude
of reasons for which they reject it. Reliance on others to
take care of security needs; digital-security advice that is too
marketing-oriented, too inconvenient, or too advanced; over-
saturation; and the belief that the user either is not at risk or
will be victimized no matter what they do are all common
reasons for rejecting advice or stopping security behaviors.
Figure 4 summarizes the prevalence of these reasons for reject-
ing digital- and physical-security advice. Below, we provide
further detail on these reasons, and compare and contrast
participant’s motivations for rejecting advice in each domain.
It’s Not My Job. Eighteen participants rely on the compa-
nies whose software, hardware, or services they use to keep
them safe. These users do not seem to be making rational
cost-benefit calculations about particular personal behaviors
being redundant to the services provided by these companies;
rather, they simply assume that they are not responsible for the
security of a given system because a corporation they trust is
taking care of it. For example, P8 comments, “I had been
banking with a bank that I wasn’t happy with. Then I went
to Bank of America, which was this big bank. I’m like, ‘Oh,
they’re awesome so I don’t have to worry about anything. I
will be safe.’”
In addition to trusting corporations to take care of security
for them, participants also rely on browser and device prompts
(N=20), software defaults (N=20) and security requirements
imposed by their services (e.g., your password must be 16
characters long) (N=14) to keep them safe. For example, many
participants use a password or passcode to lock their phone
because the phone prompted them to do so at set-up. P2 says,
“When you boot up these phones now, they just give you
the option.” Relatedly, P4 says she only has passwords or
passcodes on her Mac products because, “the Mac products
prompt you to set up the security things...I never thought
about it [for the Kindle]. I guess it wasn’t prompted...I would
have to look up, how to do it on the Kindle.” In addition to
prompts, users rely on software defaults, such as those in anti-
virus software, to provide security tactics: P17 comments, that
she has a script and popup blocker because it “was through
McAfee and it was automatic. . . . I’m not really technical
savvy where I can block stuff and...go into my settings and
know what I’m messing with.”
This Is Too Inconvenient. Inconvenience is often cited
as a possible explanation for users rejecting digital-security
advice [5], [6], [50], but it was not the most prevalent reason
we discovered. The inconvenience of implementing advice
was cited by six participants, five of whom mentioned it in
the context of digital security. P20 says she does not change
the passwords on her accounts, because “from a convenience
standpoint, it’s just easier to keep them as they are and not risk
being locked out.” Relatedly, P23 says she “took the password
off the wireless because we [her family] were forgetting it.” In
another example, P9 comments that a security strategy he has
considered, and thinks would be useful, is encryption. How-
ever, “I haven’t really thought about it...maybe I should...it
seems like it would make everything infinitely harder to break
into and only 10% harder for me to deal with, but it just hasn’t
been worth the trouble.” Thus, even minor inconvenience may
deter users from implementing a new security behavior.
Too Much Marketing. Eight participants rejected digital-
and physical-security advice because it appears to be more
about selling a product than about providing advice: “I don’t
do anything with a price tag attached. I could be persuaded to
do it if I had a serious problem. I did have my identity stolen
one time but I was able to fix it, but I’m not one of these
people who signs up for LifeLock or something like that,”
says P22. Similarly, P16 wishes that physical-security advice
could be more substantive, “instead of just on an ad, because
they change ads every day.”
This Advice is Too Advanced. Some participants find the
digital-security advice they see too advanced (N=7). Four of
the participants who reported this were highly educated (they
held an M.S. or above). P9 holds a computer engineering
degree, but says, “I know just enough to not be useful about
various levels of security on website and HTTPS and SSL
and I don’t even know what the acronyms mean, but I
know that some websites are more secure and others aren’t,
and I don’t pay attention to it.” P8, who holds a masters
degree, also struggles to understand too-complex advice: she
sometimes rejects advice, “Depending on the number of steps
and the complexity of it because I’m not a IT person . . . it
can be complex what they’re asking me to do.” Similarly,
P13 comments, “I’ve heard when you transfer files, you can
encrypt, but I don’t know how, but one of my colleagues did
do that when he sent out files, but I don’t because of lack of
knowledge and skill.” An additional three participants chose
not to practice a particular digital-security behavior because
they did not understand how to do so: “I’m still trying to
figure out how in the world do I use that [antivirus software]
because they never explained it to me,” says P16.
I’m Over-saturated. Participants may also reject advice
not because the behavior proposed is inconvenient in itself,
but because they cannot bear the thought of needing to use
one more security behavior. Nine participants stated that they
felt over-saturated and lacked the time to implement the advice
they see, even if they think it is good advice. P7 says: “Part
of it is just saturation. You get so much information from
so many sources. I don’t even know sometimes what’s worth
looking at.” P23 intends to implement the advice but has not
gotten around to it yet: “[I’ve] heard about things that will
protect your information, I don’t remember the names of them.
Haven’t gotten around to it yet, but I will in the near future.”
P6 thinks that two-factor authentication is a good idea but
hasn’t yet implemented it on all of his services. “I just don’t
think about it day to day. Every time I run across it, I’m like,
‘Yeah, that’s a good idea,’ but then it just falls right out of
my head,” he says. Additionally, P6 notes that in general that
he often does not take security advice because he has “kind
of reached a level of don’t care. It’s so obvious to me that I
don’t know what I don’t know, that it’s frustrating to try to
tease apart what would be helpful and what wouldn’t.”
I’m Not At Risk. Eight participants rejected physical-
security advice as unnecessary due to their low risk profile.
For example, P24 says: “[I’ve] heard about 24-7 monitoring
and crap like that, I think it’s overkill. If everyone [in my
neighborhood] was driving fancy cars, maybe.”
Four participants rejected digital-security advice for the
same reason. P5 says he does not put a password on his phone
because, “I just don’t feel I have that much interesting stuff
on there.” P10 comments that she does not use or look for
security tactics for her tablet, because “there’s nothing personal
on the tablet.” Similarly, P3 does not take security advice for
browsing because she is “not so concerned about browsing as
opposed to personal financial information.” Surprisingly, the
participants who cited these feelings for digital security were
of varied incomes, and the overall incidence of feelings of
“unimportance” around digital security was quite low. This
is in contrast to prior work, which had proposed that many
users, particularly those with lower incomes, might not execute
security behaviors due to low valuation of their data [4]. One
possible cause for this change is that as technology becomes
more ubiquitous, users are becoming more aware of the value
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Fig. 5. Lower income participants are more likely to feel that it is inevitable
they will become the victim of a digital security threat.
of their data.
No Matter What, I Will Get Hacked.
Participants may also reject digital-security advice because
they feel that no matter what they do, they will still become
victims. Interestingly, seven out of nine participants with
incomes above $70,000 do not feel this sense of inevitability,
while only four out of eight participants with incomes below
$50,000 do not cite these feelings. “I feel like there is a
level of inevitability. I feel like you’re lucky if nothing ever
happens. You can take all of the steps and people will find
ways. We can clearly see around pretty much anything. If
you don’t fall into that by chance then you’re lucky. I feel
like if you do everything you’re supposed to do, like in life,
something can still happen,” says P6, who lives in a household
that earned between $30,000 and $50,000 in 2014. Figure 5
shows these results. This difference in feelings may also be
related to a difference in these participants’ levels of security
sensitivity, which we discuss below in Section IV-E. Only three
participants cited similar feelings of inevitability in the domain
of physical security. These three participants were all women,
and it is probable that their feelings of inevitability may stem
from gender-based crime rate differences and socialization to
be more fearful due to their gender [49].
Other reasons for rejecting advice. A few participants
described reasoning that was less common but still interesting,
with possible implications for design. One participant (P3)
noted that he rejects advice because he see it in the wrong
venue: “I see the information while on [public transit] to work
and then by the end of the day, looking at a computer is the
last thing I want to do.” We hypothesize that this factor may
be important for many users, even though no other participants
explicitly mentioned it; we discuss it further in the context of
design recommendations in Section V.
Additionally, some participants reported rejecting what they
perceived as good advice for others because they were already
confident in their own behaviors (N=3). P25 notes that having
others tell him how to be digitally secure is pointless, because:
“I do what I do based on my own personal feelings and
intellect, so I don’t find it useful, but for someone who didn’t
know it would be useful. Never found any of the advice useful.
I just have my own way of protecting what I do, so it’s like
if someone’s telling you how to make a PB&J sandwich, and
I’m like I know how to do it. But if they’re saying something
drastic—don’t do this, this, and this—then I’ll look at it, but
usually, no.”
Reasons for Rejecting Digital vs. Physical Security. Many
reasons for rejecting advice were common to the digital and
physical domains. However, a few reasons were unique to
digital security: advice that is too advanced, over-saturation,
and the assumption that a corporation who provides services to
the user will protect them. Feelings of inevitability were more
prevalent for digital security (N=8 digital, N=3 physical) than
for physical security. Inversely, feelings that risk was low and
therefore implementing a new behavior was unnecessary were
more common for physical than digital security. These dif-
ferences imply that the digital-security community has much
to learn from the physical security domain about effective
security education.
E. Security-Sensitive vs. General Users
In addition to differences between users’ behavior in the
physical- and digital-security domains, there are also differ-
ences between users who are or are not security-sensitive.
We recruited security-sensitive users to investigate whether
extra training in handling confidential or sensitive data at
work would affect how participants process security advice
in their personal lives. Below, we address security-sensitive
users’ differences from general users in the domain of digital
security: they are more likely to evaluate advice based on
the trustworthiness of the advice source; they are less likely
to use two-factor authentication than general users; they feel
that digital-security advice is more useful than physical; the
majority take security advice from their workplace; and they
may express fewer feelings of inevitability than do general
users. The prevalence of these differences is summarized in
Figure 6. Additionally, we examine whether security-sensitive
users have better security behavior intentions than do general
users.
Security-Sensitive Participants are Even More Likely to
Evaluate Advice Based on Their Trust of the Source.
Nine of 15 security-sensitive participants cited the trustwor-
thiness of the advice source as their key metric for choosing
to take digital-security advice, compared to only two of 10
general users. We suspect that security-sensitive users may be
more discerning about advice because they have been trained
to look critically at the digital information they come across.
A primary component of workplace digital-security training is
reminders not to trust unknown individuals [51], [52]. This
emphasis on judging sources of information critically may
translate over to security-sensitive users’ home environments
from these trainings, making them more skeptical of advice
provided by sources they do not trust.
Security-Sensitive Users are Less Likely to Use Two-Factor
Authentication. Seven of 15 security-sensitive users had
adopted 2FA, compared to eight of 10 general users. We hy-
pothesize that security-sensitive users are less trusting that the
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Fig. 6. Security sensitive users differ from general sers in their valuation of
digital-security advice, their reasons for taking advice, their use of two-factor
authentication, and some of their advice sources.
service requesting 2FA can protect the personal information
they are providing, as four of the security-sensitive users cite
privacy concerns as a reason for not using 2FA. User’s mo-
tivations for accpeting and rejecting two-factor authentication
are discussed in more detail in Section IV-F.
Security-Sensitive Users Feel Digital Advice is More Useful
than Physical Advice. Eight of 15 security-sensitive users
believe digital-security advice is more useful, compared to
two of 10 general users. We speculate this may be related to
these users being more frequently reminded to pay attention
to digital security and data sensitivity.
Most Security-Sensitive Participants Took Digital-Security
Advice from Their Workplace. Thirteen out of 15 security
sensitive users took advice from their workplace, contrasted
with four of 10 regular users. This is unsurprising given the
workplace emphasis on digital-security and regular trainings
that occur for security-sensitive users. Additionally, security-
sensitive users may be more likely to take advice from IT
professionals. Eight of 15 security sensitive users took digital-
security advice from IT professionals, compared to four out
of 10 general users. This trend is not as differentiable as the
other trends detailed in this section, and thus will require more
investigation in future research.
We suspected this reliance on workplace and IT profession-
als for security information would correspond to a relative
decrease in reliance on other advice sources. Surprisingly,
however, security-sensitive and general users cited family,
peers, media, and negative experiences at similar rates.
Security Sensitivity and Feelings of Inevitability. As
mentioned in Section IV-D, we found that participants with
lower incomes expressed more feelings of inevitable victim-
ization in digital security than did higher-income participants.
We also found that general users expressed more feelings of
inevitability than did security-sensitive users. Six out of 10
general users expressed these feelings, contrasted with three
out of 15 security sensitive users. However, in our sample
security-sensitive users also tended to have higher incomes
than general users. Thus, it is unclear whether the correlate in
the case of inevitability feelings is income, security-sensitivity,
or a combination of both.
Security-Sensitive Users and Security Behavior. We used
the SEBIS scale, as described in Section IV-B, to compare
behavioral intentions of security-sensitive participants to those
of general participants. Security-sensitive users scored an
average of 3.3 (S.D.=0.6), while general users scored a slightly
lower average of 2.8 (S.D.=0.4). Given our small sample size,
it is difficult to assess whether this difference is meaningful;
further exploration is needed in this area.
F. Case Study: Two-factor Authentication
As mentioned in Section II-B, Ion et al. report that use of
two-factor authentication (2FA) is one of the top three security
behaviors recommended by or used by security experts. How-
ever, only 40% of the non-expert users in that study reported
using 2FA. Our results shed some light on the reasoning behind
users’ acceptance or rejection of this behavior.
How and Why I Use Two-Factor Authentication. Of the
participants we interviewed, more than half reported using
2FA (N=14). In our interview questions about 2FA, we started
by defining 2FA as “a service where you might put in your
phone number and then be sent a verification code.” Given
this definition, all participants recognized 2FA and were able to
substantively answer our interview questions on this topic. We
hypothesize that providing this more detailed definition may
account for the difference in the proportion of our respondents
(50%) and the proportion of respondents in the work of Ion et.
al. (40%) who reported using 2FA. Of our 14 participants who
had used 2FA, five used 2FA for some, but not all services.
These participants use 2FA for those services they feel are
particularly important: P6 says, “I’ve got 2FA on one thing,
and that is my insurance company. I did that because [of
a negative experience at my workplace.] I figured that [my
insurance] was one of the most important things, because...it
covers every aspect in my life. I didn’t want anyone to mess
with that.”
Alternately, users may only use 2FA on services that
strongly encourage or force them to do so: “I do that with
Xbox Live, they force me to do that. I think Google, they
want me to do that but I always say later,” comments P12. 1
Similarly, P14 says: “Yes, at one time Verizon, because I have
a Verizon email account, it asked me to do [2FA], it takes a
while but I’ve done it...it forced me to do it.” Of the remaining
nine participants who used 2FA, two did not understand what
they were doing: P16 comments, “You mean when it asks to
use by text or phone call? I do that, even though I hate doing
it, because I’m trying to figure out what is the purpose, but it
says the purpose is your safety and security.”
Why I Don’t Use Two-Factor Authentication. Eleven
participants knew about but chose not to use 2FA. Five of these
participants declined 2FA due to privacy concerns: specifically,
they worried about giving out their personal phone number,
about GPS tracking based on that phone number, and about
the service providing 2FA’s ability to keep their information se-
cure. For example, P13 says: “No, [I want] nothing connected
to the phone. So, the phone is directly connected to the email.
I don’t feel comfortable to let people in if it’s connected to
the email account.” With regard to Google’s ability to protect
the information used for verification, P3 says: “I think I do
have that [2FA] capacity. I think I’ve always declined Gmail
enabling that access...Based on what I know about Gmail, it
just seemed like giving up too much information to Google.”
Similarly, P23 says: “Google has prompted but I’ve always
ignored it because I think that someone will get ahold of it,
I’m not saying they would, but I’m just always like, you know,
yeah.”
In addition to privacy concerns, two participants declined to
use 2FA due to convenience concerns: “Two years ago, at the
beginning of the summer, Google introduced 2FA, and this
was an issue because I tried to log in and I didn’t get cell
service and I couldn’t get the text message to log in, and that
was the last time I tried to change anything,” says P9. And two
participants declined the service due to lack of understanding.
V. DESIGN GUIDELINES
It is important to minimize digital-security advice so that
users do not feel overwhelmed. As mentioned in results,
several users felt over-saturated with advice and further, felt
that they lacked the time to implement all the advice they
were given. This is consistent with the compliance-budget
model [6]. Given that we found that many users struggle
to evaluate the plausibility and usefulness of digital-security
advice, reducing the amount of advice they need to process
will significantly reduce their cognitive load. This of course
1Note that XBox Live does not require two-factor authentication, but this
participant may have misinterpreted the prompt screen as a requirement.
requires identifying a small set of recommendations that
provide high value to users; Ion et al. have made progress
in this direction [7]. While the amount of advice provided
should be strictly limited, our findings suggest that critical
advice can be made more effective in several ways. Design
recommendations for achieving this efficacy and distributing
advice to users are detailed below.
Signal Credibility. Our participants reported relying on the
credibility of sources to evaluate digital-security advice, but
sometimes struggling to assess this credibility. Drawing on
the heuristics our participants report using, we recommend
designing digital-security advice that clearly states the author’s
qualifications in digital security. Because some participants
used user reviews to evaluate advice, a system to request
and promote high-quality user rankings might also provide
evidence of credibility.
Further, we found that users reject security advice that
contains marketing material; therefore, advice that suggests or
encourages purchasing a particular product or service (espe-
cially if associated with the advice source) reduces credibility
and should therefore be avoided.
Address Privacy. Our case study of two-factor authentica-
tion suggests that users may reject security advice if they feel
it threatens their privacy. Both 2FA and password managers
appear in the top six expert-recommended digital security
behaviors [7]; our results suggest that privacy concerns and
mis-understandings are at least partially driving low adoption
of each technique. For example, with regard to password
managers, P7 notes that she does not like “the notion of
a machine memorizing my password, I don’t know where
it’s going, I don’t know who has it and I don’t know what
is happening with it.” We hypothesize that users may be
prioritizing the immediate risk of sharing private information
(e.g. phone number) over the long-term risk of compromising
the service (e.g. email) for which they are considering 2FA.
This is an example of present bias, our tendency to prioritize
immediate rewards or concerns over long-term gains [53].
Thus, our second recommendation for designing advice is
to clearly explain to users (and not just in a privacy policy that
no users will read) how their personal data, such as a phone
number for 2FA or passwords for a password manager, will
be protected. Mitigating these privacy concerns could provide
high-impact benefits for users.
Simplify and Explain. More than half of our participants
felt that physical-security advice was more trustworthy, or
more useful, than digital-security advice, in part due to the
simplicity and actionability of physical-security advice. Con-
sequently, we suggest that it is key to ensure digital-security
advice is straightforward, contains step-by-step instructions,
and avoids technical jargon while clearly explaining why the
technique recommended is necessary to keep users secure.
Distribute Advice Via Pre-existing Channels. Somewhat
surprisingly, we found that many participants trust hardware
and software companies to keep them secure without ad-
ditional intervention; other participants valued direct advice
from those companies. It seems, therefore, that corporations
such as Google, Apple, and Comcast are well positioned to
make a large impact on users’ digital security, as already-
trusted sources of perceived credible advice. As mentioned
above, however, it is crucial for these corporations to be
easily recognizable as the source of advice and to avoid the
perception of marketing.
We also found that participants rely on IT professionals,
particularly those from their workplaces, as a source of cred-
ible digital-security advice even for personal technology. We
believe these individuals, too, could make a significant positive
impact on users’ security behavior, if they can be trained to
distribute a small set of valuable advice.
Additionally, as shown both in our results and in Rader et
al.’s work, negative events experienced by users or their friends
can be key motivators for security behavior change [2]. We
find that mimicking these negative events via visual media
can also be very effective. As a result, we suggest developing
movies or TV shows that demonstrate negative digital-security
events via realistic, relatable characters. Since we found that
users did not learn from negative experiences in which they
could not clearly see the cause of the event and how to prevent
it, it is also important to make clear in this visual-media advice
what users could do to prevent the negative event shown.
VI. SUMMARY
Users must sift through a multitude of security advice to
determine which security behaviors to implement and which
to reject. This process of deciding to implement security tactics
based on the advice of others is multi-faceted and complex. In
an effort to understand users’ choices, we conducted a semi-
structured interview study of 25 participants with varied demo-
graphics and security sensitivities. We asked questions about
users’ security behaviors, how they learned these behaviors,
and why they accepted or rejected different behaviors and
pieces of advice. Our analysis of these interviews resulted in
three key findings.
First, our findings suggest a few notable differences between
security-sensitive and general users: they consider digital-
security advice more useful than physical advice in their day-
to-day lives and they rely heavily on their workplace as a
source of digital-security advice.
Second, we found that users reject security advice for a
number of somewhat surprising reasons, including containing
too much marketing information and threatening users’ sense
of privacy. Further, a majority of participants believed that
someone or something else was responsible for their security
in at least one digital domain (e.g., online banking).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, our findings indicate
that users believe they lack the skills to evaluate the content
of digital-security advice and must instead rely on their
evaluation of the trustworthiness of the advice source when
determining whether to accept the advice. Sources they trust
include their workplace, providers of their digital services, IT
professionals, family members, and friends. Our participants
also relied upon media as a source of advice, but only if it
passed an heuristic credibility test. Finally, the majority of
participants reported changing their security behavior based
on negative events. These events took the form of personal
experiences, stories told by family and friends, or vignettes
in TV shows or movies. Thus, by signaling credibility and
relying on pre-existing trusted channels, security experts may
be able to amplify the most important advice, helping users
to spend their security-compliance budget wisely.
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• Could you tell me a little bit about what you do?
• Do you handle sensitive or private data as part of your
job?
– Could you tell me a little bit more about that data?
Digital Security
Device Protection
• How many devices do you use to access the internet for
personal use?
– Do you have a smartphone? Tablet? Multiple com-
puters?
– What type or brand of smartphone or computer (e.g.
Windows/Mac/Linux) do you use?
• Can you show me how you access your devices?
– When was the last time you changed this password?
• Are there any other tactics you use to protect your
devices?
• Do you use antivirus software?
– How often do you run the software?
– Did you install it or did it come with your computer?
– Why do you use it?
• Why do you use these strategies for protecting your
[phone/computer/devices]? For each strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• Is there a password on your wireless internet at home?
– Did you set up this password?
– When was the last time you changed this password?
– Were you prompted to do so?
• Is there a password on your router?
• Are there any other tactics you use to protect your
wireless internet?
• Why do you use these strategies for protecting your
wireless internet? For each strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?




• Do you browse the internet?
• Do you access your email via a web browser (e.g.
Safari/Firefox/Chrome/Internet Explorer)?
• Do you shop online or bank online?
• Do you do all of these activities on all of your devices?
• Scenario: Let’s imagine that you have a family mem-
ber (parent/spouse/sibling/child) with whom you share a
computer. You are searching for a surprise birthday gift,
lets say a necklace, for this person, and you are using
the internet to research potential gifts. Can you show me
what you would do to start this project?
• In general, how do you stay secure when browsing the
internet or checking your email?
– When was the last time you changed your email
password?
∗ Were you prompted to do so?
– Do you use two-factor authentication?
∗ Two-factor authentication is a service where you
might put in your phone number and then be sent
a verification code.
– Do you use the privacy settings when browsing?
– Do you ever use incognito browsing or private
browsing?
– Do you use a script, popup, or cookie blocker?
– How do you treat emails from unknown individuals?
– Are there any particular precautions you take when
downloading from the internet?
• Are there any other tactics you use when browsing the
internet/accessing your email via the internet?
• Why do you use these strategies for staying secure while
browsing the internet or accessing your email? For each
strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• How secure do you feel you are when browsing the
internet and accessing your email?
Online Shopping/Banking
• Narration: Can you please walk me through what you
would do to login to your banking website? Now please
pretend you are exiting the website as if you had just
completed your banking business.
• How often do you change your password for online
banking or shopping accounts?
• Are there any other tactics you use when shopping online
or doing online banking?
– Do you always use the same credit card?
– Do you use paypal?
– Do you use a single use credit card number?
• Why do you use these strategies for staying secure while
online shopping or online banking? For each strategy,
ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• How secure do you feel you are when online shopping
and online banking?
General Advice
• Do you store your passwords anywhere?
– Where do you store them?
– In what format do you store them?
– Is it password protected or locked?
– Why did you start doing this?
– When did you start doing this?
• Do you ever look for new information or talk to someone
about tactics such as [what they mention above for
security]?
– Where do you look for this information and with
whom do you talk?
• Do you often see news pieces, ads, or articles on TV, in
the newspaper, or online with tips or advice about how
to protect yourself online?
– How do you feel about the information provided?
– Are there strategies you have learned from these
sources?
• What other sources do you consult when seeking security
advice?
• Do you see any security advice that you do not take?
– Why do you not take it?
• Do you feel that you have the ability to make yourself
more digitally secure?
• Whom or what would you say has most influenced your
overall approach to computer security, and in what way?
Physical Security
Dwelling Security
• Do you live in a house or an apartment?
– Do you own your dwelling?
– Do you live alone, with a partner, family, or with
roommates?
• Can you walk me through what you do as you leave your
dwelling?
– Are there one or two locks?
– Is it a hard lock or an electronic lock?
– Is that something that came with the building or
something you installed?
∗ Why did you install the locks?
• Can you walk me through what you do when you prepare
to go to bed in the evening and when you return from
your day of work?
• Are there any other strategies, which you have not
mentioned, that you use to secure your dwelling?
– Light timers?
– Security system?
– Security system or guard dog signs?
• Is there anything that led you to buy or rent in the location
you did?
• Why do you use these strategies for securing your
dwelling? For each strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Is this strategy something that is important to you,
or something you feel is more important to other
members of your household who share the dwelling?
– Why would you say that it is more important to
[you/other]?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• How secure do you feel that you are when you are at
home?
• How secure do you feel that your belongings are when
you are not home?
Transit Security
Car (if applicable)
• What is your primary method of transportation?
• Do you own or lease your car?
• Where is it typically parked?
• Can you walk me through what you do when you get out
of your car, once it is parked?
– What do you do if you have to store items in the
car?
• Are there any other strategies, which you have not
mentioned, that you use to protect your vehicle?
• Why do you use these strategies for protecting your
vehicle? For each strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Is this strategy something that is important to you,
or something you feel is more important to people
with whom you share the car (if applicable)?
– Why would you say that it is more important to
[you/other]?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• How secure do you feel that your car is when it is parked?
• How secure do you feel the belongings you have in your
car are, when the car is parked?
Bicycle (if applicable)
• Do you own or rent or bikeshare your bicycle?
• Where is it typically stored?
• Can you walk me through what you do when you get off
your bicycle once it is parked somewhere?
– What type of lock do you use?
– To what object do you lock the bike?
– Where do you affix the lock?
• Are there any other strategies, which you have not
mentioned, that you use to protect your bike?
• Why do you use these strategies for securing your bike?
For each strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Is this strategy something that is important to you,
or something you feel is more important to people
with whom you share the bike?
∗ Why would you say that it is more important to
[you/other]?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• How secure do you feel that your bike is when it is
unattended?
Personal Security (walking)
• Where do you tend to walk?
– Do you walk more than 10 minutes a day?
• Are there any particular approaches you take, or items
you carry, when walking alone?
• Have you had any martial arts/self defense training?
– Why did you undergo this training? Who adminis-
tered the training?
• Why do you use these strategies? For each strategy, ask:
– When did you start using this strategy?
– How do you feel that this strategy works to protect
you?
– Why did you choose to use this strategy over using
a different one?
– What are you most worried about?
– Have you ever had a negative experience?
– Do you know anyone who has had a negative expe-
rience?
– Are there ever times when you do not choose to use
this strategy?
– Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about
but do not use?
• How secure do you feel you are when walking?
General Advice
• Do you ever look for new information or talk to some-
one about tactics such as for protection your [dwelling,
vehicle/bike, self, other members of your family]?
– Where do you look for this information and with
whom do you talk?
• Do you often see news pieces, ads, or articles on TV, in
the newspaper, or online with tips/advice, social media
posts, chain emails on how to protect your [dwelling,
vehicle/bike, self, other members of your family]?
– How do you feel about the information provided?
– Are there strategies you have considered or heard
about but do not use?
• What other sources do you consult when seeking physical
security advice?
• Do you feel that you have the ability to make yourself
more physically secure?
• Whom or what would you say has most influenced your
overall approach to physical security, and in what way?
• Would you say that you see more advice about digital
security or about physical security?
• Which security advice, digital or physical, do you find
more trustworthy?
• Which more useful?
